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AN EXTRAORDINARY RULE: RULE XVIII,
RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
WILLARD A. SULLIVAN, JR.*
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has promul-
gated a new rule governing the exercise of original jurisdiction in
the only class of cases that the Supreme Court of Appeals has
original jurisdiction-the extraordinary cases of mandamus, prohi-
bition, and habeas corpus. The new rule restricts access to the
court, thereby limiting the availability of constitutional writs and
raising the question of whether the new rule is reasonable, neces-
sary, and constitutional.
By order entered February 19, 1974, the Supreme Court of
Appeals promulgated and adopted Rule XVIII of the Rules of Prac-
tice in the Supreme Court of Appeals. Rule XVIII, effective July
1, 1974, governs the procedure of a petitioner's invocation of, and
the court's exercise of, the original jurisdiction granted by the West
Virginia Constitution in cases of habeas corpus, mandamus, and
prohibition.' The eight paragraphs of the new rule provide for
*A.B., Harvard University (1965); J.D., West Virginia University (1969). Mem-
ber of the firm of Campbell, Love, Woodroe & Kizer, Charleston, West Virginia.
1 W. VA. CONST. art VIII, § 3. This article was written prior to the general
election of November 5, 1974, at which time the citizens of West Virginia ratified
the Judicial Reorganization Amendment. The Amendment provides a totally new
article VIII to the constitution, the basic purpose being to "provide for a unified
system of courts to be established in the State." Berry, A Proposed New Judicial
Article for West Virginia, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 481, 483 (1974). Since the Amendment
has been ratified, the first sentence of section three of article VIII of the constitution
reads as follows: "The supreme court of appeals shall have original jurisdiction of
proceedings in habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition and certiorari." Acts of the
61st W. Va. Leg., Comm. Substitute for S.J. Res. No. 6, Reg. Sess. (1974). A
comparison of this sentence with the first sentence of the former section conferring
original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court of Appeals-article VIII, section three
-reveals that the granting of jurisdiction is in the same words-"shall have original
jurisdiction"-and the only real difference is that the Amendment adds certiorari
as one of the extraordinary writs available in the Supreme Court of Appeals.
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pleadings and exhibits, the filing of applications for writs, notice
to the respondent, memoranda of law, depositions, and so forth.
The primary purpose of Rule XVIII, however, is suggested in sec-
tion one, which begins: "Original jurisdiction of this court should
not be invoked if adequate relief appears to be available in a court
of concurrent jurisdiction." A "court of concurrent jurisdiction"
would be the circuit court of any county2 or one of several statutory
courts.3 The court has as its obvious objective the reduction of its
original jurisdiction caseload for the purpose of permitting it to
take more cases on appeal, to spend more time on its decisions, or
to insure against the expenditures of more time in the future on
the historically-increasing number of original jurisdiction applica-
tions.4
The court's newly-stated policy finds further expression in
section one of the new rule, which requires that if an application
for the extraordinary writ can be
2 W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 12; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-1 to -12 (1966) (pro-
hibition and mandamus); Id. §§ 53-4-1 to -13 (habeas corpus); Id. §§ 53-4A-1 to -
11 (1974 Cum. Supp.) (post conviction habeas corpus). The Judicial Reorganization
Amendment, discussed in note 1 supra, continues the concurrent jurisdiction of the
circuit courts. Under section six of article VIII, they "have original and general
jurisdiction. . . of proceedings in habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohi-
bition and certiorari." In addition, section thirteen continues "the laws of this State
[that] are in force on the effective date of this article and are not repugnant
thereto," which presumably means that the statutes, including the provisions of
chapter fifty-three, pertaining to the extraordinary writs, would remain in full force
and effect. Acts of the 61st W. Va. Leg., Comm. Substitute for S.J. Res. No. 6, Reg.
Sess. (1974).
For example, the Kanawha County Court of Common Pleas, an inferior civil
court, has jurisdiction to grant writs of mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus,
at least in certain circumstances. Acts of the 59th W. Va. Leg. ch. 36, Reg. Sess.
(1970); Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 32, Reg. Sess. (1964); Acts of the 32d W.
Va. Leg. ch. 109, Reg. Sess. (1915). As explained in note 1 supra, this article was
written prior to the electorate's decision on the Judicial Reorganization Amend-
ment which, as adopted, eliminates the statutory courts of limited jurisdiction.
Under section five of article VIII as provided in the Amendment, the courts of
limited jurisdiction are absorbed into the circuit courts and the judge of each
"statutory court of record of limited jurisdiction . . . shall . . . become a judge"
of the circuit court upon the effective date of the Amendment.
Although no comprehensive statistical information on applications to the
West Virginia courts for writs of habeas corpus is available, it is generally thought
that the number of petitions in all courts has been increasing. This is indicated in
West Virginia by the number of cases reaching the federal courts, following exhaus-
tion of state remedies. See State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas
Corpus, 12 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 149 (1970). For the experience of one state, see
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lawfully made to a lower court in the first instance, the petition,
in addition to the matters required by law to support the appli-
cation, shall also set forth the circumstances which in the opin-
ion of the applicant render it proper that the writ or rule should
issue originally from this Court and not from such lower court.5
This section further provides that if the court decides that it
should not exercise original jurisdiction in a certain case, it "may"
(presumably will) "refuse . . . the writ or rule prayed for . .. .
The refusal is "without prejudice" so that another request for relief
may be made to "a proper court having [concurrent] jurisdic-
tion."'
The effect of the new rule and the policy of section one will
enable the court, openly and with apparent legitimacy, to exercise
original jurisdiction at its own discretion. This result is not entirely
illogical and, as a practical matter, may appear desirable or even
necessary from the court's standpoint. Ultimately, the proceedings
on any petition in a lower court are reviewable in the Supreme
Court of Appeals by writ of error. Therefore, any errors committed
by the lower court in extraordinary cases, as in ordinary cases, are
reviewable on appeal in the Supreme Court of Appeals. The ques-
tion arises, however: Is it constitutional for the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals to limit the exercise of its jurisdiction in
original cases?
The West Virginia Constitution provides that the Supreme
Court of Appeals "shall have original jurisdiction in cases of ha-
beas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition."' The constitution does
not expressly state that the court shall exercise jurisdiction when-
ever application is made for habeas corpus, mandamus, or prohibi-
tion, but, on the other hand, it does not merely state that the
Supreme Court of Appeals may have jirisdiction, or that the court
5 W. VA. R. PRAc. Sup. CT. oF App. XVIII, § 1. There is, therefore, a require-
ment by rule of court that the first pleading-the petition-contain an allegation
which is in addition to the other allegations necessary to state a case for the writ
sought. Another allegation required by Rule XVIII is the "option of the applicant"
whether "the taking of evidence will be necessary for the proper disposition of the
application." Id. § 3. A similar allegation must be stated by the respondent as one
of his "grounds of defense". Id. § 4.
For examples of the kinds of cases in which the Supreme Court of Appeals
can be expected to decide to exercise its jurisdiction and for details of the mechanics
of the new rule, see Sullivan, Extraordinary Remedies - Introduction to Procedure
in the Courts of West Virginia, WEST VmGINIA PRACTICE HANDBOoK, especially n.9.
' W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (emphasis added).
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may, in its discretion, exercise or refuse to exercise jurisdiction. In
order to determine the constitutionality of Rule XVIII, it must first
be ascertained what the Supreme Court of Appeals must do under
the State Constitution in order to exercise its original jurisdiction.
The present West Virginia Constitution was ratified in 1872
and there have been no subsequent changes in the section pertain-
ing to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeals. This sec-
tion had its genesis during the First Constitutional Convention,
which was held during the years 1861 through 1863 and which
preceded the formation of the State of West Virginia. At that con-
vention, the committee charged with the responsibility of drafting
the section of the constitution pertaining to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Appeals proposed a section, the first sentence
of which was: "The Supreme Court of Appeals shall have appellate
jurisdiction only, except in cases of habeas corpus, mandamus, and
prohibition." 8 The committee draft, however, was not deemed suf-
ficient. It was defective, as Delegate James Henry Brown pointed
out, in that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals was only "by inference" and not stated expressly. Discussing
the prior practice, Mr. Brown stated that under the committee
proposal, the Supreme Court of Appeals
has original jurisdiction by inference in cases of habeas corpus,
mandamus and prohibition just as the circuit courts have on the
same subjects. Habeas corpus is that writ which secures to all
men their freedom when illegally detained. It is considered of
high importance that that writ should be of original jurisdiction
in both courts. These are the only cases in which those writs
have original jurisdiction and properly belong to the highest
tribunal. Again, the writ of prohibition-that is a writ which
commands an inferior tribunal not to do a thing which it is
attempting to do and has no right to do. So it will be perceived
at once that these three writs are the highest writs known to the
law and properly belong to the highest tribunal, and is the
means by which that highest tribunal commands and controls
the inferior tribunal to compel it to do what it ought to do when
it places a measure to prohibit it from doing what it ought not
IX DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
WEST VRiGINu 861 (1862)[1861-1863][hereinafter cited as DEBATES].
I Id. at 862. Mr. Brown was certainly one of the most talented delegates to the
convention. He was a native of Cabell County who had gone to Kanawha County
to practice law. Later, he was one of the first judges of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. For biographical information, see I DEBATES 62-63, which refers
to other sources, and, appropriately, 1 W. Va. 89 (1927).
[Vol. 77
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to do. That high writ belongs to every freeman who is illegally
detained without authority of law. It entitles him to be speedily
brought into the proper forum and confronted with his accusers.
The great jurisdiction, however, that belongs to the su-
preme court, however, is: "it shall have appellate jurisdiction
in civil cases" and in other subjects detailed. In regard to the
appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus, etc., it is necessary to
have this as well as original, because if a man should be brought
on a writ of habeas corpus before a circuit court and his rights
denied, it becomes proper that the supreme court should have
appellate jurisdiction from the circuit court for the remedy
which the appellant might have demanded of the supreme court
in the first instance.
0
This was the explanation and justification for Mr. Brown's substi-
tute proposal, which was then adopted"1 and which stated ex-
pressly the jurisdiction of the court: "The Supreme Court of Ap-
peals shall have original jurisdiction in cases of habeas corpus,
mandamus and prohibition. It shall have appellate jurisdiction in
civil cases .... ",12
This adopted substitute, emphasizing and stating initially the
court's original jurisdiction, is nearly identical to the 1872, and
present, version of article eight, section three of the constitution. 3
Thus, it is clear that the framers of the West Virginia Constitution
rejected the mere suggestion of the Supreme Court of Appeals's
possible original jurisdiction in extraordinary cases in favor of a
specific and emphatic statement of the court's jurisdiction. This
specific statement has remained constant since 1863.
This was the historical context in which the Supreme Court
of Appeals promulgated its rules of practice, effective November
1, 1884." Rule XIII regulated original jurisdiction cases and ap-
peared in the official report as follows:
II DEBATES 862-63.
" Id. at 865.
I" III DEBATES 872-73.
3 The only difference was the present identification of the Supreme Court of
Appeals as "[ilt."
1 23 W. Va. 817 (1884). The Supreme Court of Appeals had first promulgated
rules of practice in 1864. Rules of Court, 2 W. Va. xvii (1864). The first rules did
not purport to establish a procedure in original cases. The most interesting of the
first rules was Rule 20, limiting the number of counsel to argue a civil case to two,
and limiting each counsel to argument of two hours, "except when the same counsel
shall make the opening and concluding arguments, in which case he may be allowed
that much time for each argument," apparently setting an outside limit in civil
cases with two counsel, of six hours argument. Rule 20 id. at xxi. One wonders, then,
5
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RULE XII.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.
1. Petition Must be Presented to Circuit Court.
In case of habeas corpus, mandamus and prohibition, ap-
plication should not be made to this Court in the first instance,
unless there are special reasons for so doing. Petitions in such
cases should, where it is at all practicable, be first presented to
the circuit court, and when petition is presented to this Court,
the reason for not first presenting it to a judge of circuit court
must be set forth. 5
This 1884 rule was the direct ancestor of the present Rule
XVIII. The forerunner expressed a policy that the Supreme Court
of Appeals should be saved from having to consider matters which
could just as easily be presented by the petitioner to a lower court
having concurrent jurisdiction, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court of Appeals's constitutional jurisdiction. This precursory rule
was followed by an identical Rule XIII in the rules promulgated
by the court to be "[iun Force February 2, 1904."11 The 1904
version of the rule, requiring petitions to be presented first to the
circuit courts, was in force when the Supreme Court of Appeals
heard the application for a writ of habeas corpus in the case of Ex
parte Doyle. 7
Doyle applied for a writ of habeas corpus, asking for discharge
pending the disposition of his appeal or, if not, "then bail". 8 The
court found that the trial court had the authority to admit Doyle
to bail pending appeal of the misdemeanor conviction, and ulti-
mately concluded that Doyle should first seek bail in the trial
court. Doyle was remanded "to the custody of the sheriff ' .'8 Never-
theless, the court quite convincingly rejected one of the respon-
dent's arguments, saying:
The sheriff contends that this court should not entertain the
how it was that in Rule 14 the Court presumed that "[t]en causes ... shall be
considered as liable to be called on each day during term . . . ." Rule 14 id. at xx.
" W. Va. R. Prac. Sup. Ct. of App. XIII, 23 W. Va. 829 (1884).
" W. Va. R. Prac. Sup. Ct. of App. XIII, 53 W. Va. x (1904). Note that in
volume 53 of the West Virginia Reports there are two pages x, one in the front, prior
to the pages numbered in consecutive Arabic numbers, and one in the back, follow-
ing the Arabic numbers. The page which contains the rule is in the back, immedi-
ately after the Arabic numbers.
17 62 W. Va. 280, 57 S.E. 824 (1907).
11 Id. at 280, 57 S.E. at 824. Doyle had obtained from the court a writ of error
to the judgment of his misdemeanor conviction.
11 Id. at 284, 57 S.E. at 826.
[Vol. 77
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writ because no application was made, before applying to a
judge of this court, to the circuit court or its judge, as required
by rule 13 of this court . . .The Constitution . . gives the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction, concurrent with the circuit
court, of habeas corpus, and we cannot deny to a person unlaw-
fully imprisoned the right to come to this court in the first
instance. The Constitution commands this court to exercise
original jurisdiction in habeas corpus; and, if we refuse the writ
for the reason stated, do we not violate the Constitution, and
deny the person the great writ of liberty? Can a mere rule of
court, though made to save this court labor, or, as we must
rather say, to prevent its time from being consumed by numer-
ous cases of original jurisdiction, deny that great writ given by
the Constitution under a jurisdiction committed to this court?
Can we shut the door of this court against one unlawfully im-
prisoned coming with petition in hand? It is true that courts
may adopt rules for the orderly and convenient exercise of juris-
diction, but those rules cannot deny a jurisdiction plainly im-
posed upon them. Therefore, we refuse to dismiss the writ for
this cause.n
The second syllabus point of Doyle stated: "Rule of practice 13 of
the Supreme Court, requiring one asking a writ of habeas corpus
to apply to a circuit court before applying to this Court, is invalid,
and will not be enforced by this Court".
21 The notion that the 1904
rule-insofar as it required the denial of a jurisdiction "plainly
imposed"2 2 upon the Court-was invalid, was obviously a neces-
sary point of decision and one which was "adjudicated" in the
case.n
Curiously, while the opinion for the court stated that the court
refused to dismiss the writ, as requested by respondent, on the
basis that the court's time would be "consumed by numerous cases
of original jurisdiction,"A it was the court itself which promulgated
20 Id. at 282, 57 S.E. at 825.
21 Id. at 280, 57 S.E. at 824.
= Id. at 282. 57 S.E. at 825.
2 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 states that "it shall be the duty of the
[Supreme] Court [of Appeals] to prepare a syllabus of the points adjudicated in
each case ... which shall be prefixed to the published report of the case." How-
ever, the case to which that section has specific reference is the case "[wihen a
judgment or decree is reversed or affirmed", in other words, an appellate case.
There is no constitutional requirement of syllabus points in decisions in original
proceedings, although those proceedings customarily do contain syllabus points.
Thus, the question arises: is the law of the original proceeding case the syllabus
point, the holding, both, neither, either, or some other?
21 62 W. Va. at 281, 57 S.E. at 825.
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the 1904 Rule restricting the court's jurisdiction. The author of the
Doyle opinion was Judge Brannon. who was on the Supreme Court
of Appeals at the time of the promulgation of the 1904 Rule.2"
Although he was not on the court at the time of the promulgation
of the 1884 rules, the provision complained of in Doyle later be-
came a part of the 1904 rules. Subsequently, the court periodically
promulgated new rules that eliminated the provision requiring the
applicant for extraordinary relief to first pursue his remedy in the
circuit courts. This was true of the Rules promulgated in 191027 and
1912,2 while Judge Brannon was still on the court, and in 1915,21
after his retirement. 0
In 1926, the court again considered the question of whether an
application for original relief which could have been made to a
circuit court, but was not, would be denied on that ground. In
Midland Investment Corp. v. Ballard' the court flatly stated,
"wherever it appears that a [lower] Court is proceeding in a cause
without jurisdiction, prohibition will issue, regardless of the exist-
ence, of other remedies. 3 2 The court's statement followed its dis-
cussion of the availability of relief in a circuit court:
Should application have been first made to the circuit court?
It is true that in some of our earlier decisions, in cases of habeas
corpus, mandamus and prohibition, it was held that application
should not be made to this court in the first instance, unless
there are special reasons for doing so. However, at such time
there existed a rule of this court to that effect. This rule does
not now obtain. Article VIII, § 3, Const. West Virginia, provides
that the Supreme Court "shall have original jurisdiction in
cases of habeas corpus, mandamus and prohibition." It is an
inescapable duty imposed upon this court.
In Midland, then, the court clearly indicated that if an original
25 Id. at 279, 57 S.E. at 824.
26 In the official West Virginia Reports there is no indication of whether the
adoption of the 1904 rules was unanimous. There is no apparent dissent; but, on
the other hand, the Reports contain only the rules, not the orders of promulgation
or adoption, which presumably, would contain notations of dissenting votes.
W. Va. R. Prac. Sup. Ct. of App., 66 W. Va. xxxix (1910).
W. Va. R. Prac. Sup. Ct. of App., 71 W. Va. xlv (1912).
W. Va. R. Prac. Sup. Ct. of App., 73 W. Va. xlvii (1915).
1* Judge Brannon's 24 years of service on the Supreme Court of Appeals con-
cluded with his retirement at the end of his last term, January 1, 1913. 71 W. Va.
iii, xli-xlii.
3' 101 W. Va. 591, 133 S.E. 316 (1926).
32 Id. at 595, 133 S.E. at 317.
Id. at 593-94, 133 S.E. at 317.
[Vol. 77
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petition states a case for extraordinary relief, the constitution im-
poses the "inescapable duty" upon the court to grant the relief.
This is in accord with the holding in Ex parte Doyle that jurisdic-
tion in the extraordinary cases of habeas corpus, mandamus, and
prohibition is "plainly imposed" upon the court.
3 4
The position expressed in Doyle and in Midland is simply that
the availability of the constitutional writ cannot be restricted. The
scope of the constitutional remedy cannot be narrowed, and the
remedy itself cannot be defeated. In a proper case-in a case sus-
taining the claim for relief-there is a right to the writ, a right
which follows from the imposition of jurisdiction upon the court
and its "inescapable duty" to act. A mere court rule cannot impair
the availability of the remedy, thereby destroying the right to re-
lief.
35
In its prior decisions, the court has not only denied its own
ability to restrict the exercise of constitutional remedies but has
emphatically denied the authority of the Legislature to do so. In
Buskirk v. Judge" the claim was made by a habeas corpus respon-
dent that a legislative act required original cases from certain geo-
graphical regions be brought before the Supreme Court of Appeals
at certain times and places. The suggestion was made that the
prohibition case had to be brought at another term of the court
meeting at another location. The court pointed out that the Legis-
lature is precluded from inhibiting an assertion of jurisdiction and
complained that
the Legislature, by law, made in pursuance of the Constitution,
had clearly restricted the exercise of that jurisdiction, and suffi-
3' 62 W. Va. at 282, 57 S.E. at 825.
I It is not a purpose of this article to purport to determine the difference
between permissible rule making, procedure which does not affect substantive
rights, and improper procedure, that is, procedure which unduly imposes upon and
therefore unlawfully restricts substantive rights. See Curd, Substance and Proce-
dure in Rule Making, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 34 (1948). The article is a bit dated-it was
written before the promulgation of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure-but
it is a good introduction to the subject and states the opinion that "any rule of court
made touching substantive law in any degree would be invalid as legislating." Id.
at 48. Judge Curd seems to accept what he considers to be the view of Salmond,
that while some law is substantive and some procedural, there is a "twilight zone"
where it is difficult to tell the difference. Id. at 34, 36, 48-49. Indeed, it can be
argued that any procedural rule affects substantive law and the difference, if there
is any, between procedural law and substantive law merely involves questions of
degree and of conflicting values, polices, and objectives.
11 7 W. Va. 91 (1873).
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ciently defined such restriction to make it manifest. Clearly this
Court cannot beneficially or reasonably exercise original
jurisdiction with effect in case of writs of mandamus, habeas
corpus and prohibition if the exercise of the jurisdiction is
confined or limited in any case to the [particular] terms of the
Court . ..
In addition, the court made it clear in Buskirk that the constitu-
tional provision, by providing for jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court of Appeals, thereby provided "a remedy for the citizen."38
Similarly, in Donaldson v. Voltz 39 the court examined certain
legislative restrictions enacted against the exercise of a constitu-
tional exemption, and declared the restrictions to be void, saying:
Where a constitution establishes a right but has not particularly
designated the manner of its exercise, it is within the constitu-
tional limits of the legislative power to adopt all necessary regu-
lations in regard to the time and mode of exercising it, which
are reasonable and uniform and designed to secure and facili-
tate the exercise of such right. Such a construction would afford
no warrant for such an exercise of the legislative power, as under
the pretense of regulating should subvert or destroy the right
itself.4'
Relying upon Buskirk and Donaldson, the Supreme Court of
Appeals in 1971 decided the validity of certain provisions of the
then recently-enacted Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act' in
State ex rel. Burgett v. Oakley.2 In Burgett, the respondent as-
serted that the provisions of the Act permitted "post-conviction
habeas corpus relief only to a convicted defendant" who (1) "has
begun to serve" his sentence and (2) "then only after he has ex-
hausted his right to appeal or . . .after his appeal time has ex-
pired.413 The court decided that the Legislature "did not intend"
to do that which it had purported to do, namely limit the "use of
the writ" to such an extent that the writ "would only be available
after conviction and actual imprisonment and after the right to
appeal has been exhausted or the appeal period has expired.""
3' Id. at 100.
Id. at 99.
3' 19 W. Va. 156 (1881).
,0 Id. at 158.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-4A-1 to -11 (1974 Cum. Supp.).
,2 184 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1971).
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Such a limitation, thought the court, was unreasonable and, there-
fore, unconstitutional:
To so limit the use of the writ of habeas corpus in criminal cases
would be unreasonable and would restrict and limit rather than
secure and facilitate the exercise of this constitutional right and
would be clearly unconstitutional.
We therefore hold that the intent of the Post-Conviction
Habeas Corpus Act was to liberalize, rather than restrict, the
exercise of the writ of habeas corpus in criminal cases. 5
It is to be noted that the court considered the legislation to be
unreasonable. The standard of reasonableness was earlier referred
to in Buskirk, in terms of the court's reasonable "exercise" of its
"original jurisdiction," which the court thought had been inter-
ferred with by the Legislature."0 The Court appeared to be at-
tempting to avoid the substance-procedure dichotomy,47 by admit-
ting that the Legislature has the authority to make reasonable
rules, so long as the rules provide a logical mechanism for obtain-
ing the desired remedy and do not limit the "exercise of ' a "consti-
tutional right."" Just how this is to be done is not clear.
The present rule, Rule XVIII, had as its apparent objective the
saving of the court's time. The court recognized that circuit courts
also have the constitutional authority to grant extraordinary writs
and that the judgments of the circuit courts are reviewable on
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals. As the court stated in
Fleming v. Commissioners,4 the rule encouraging prior application
to a circuit court was
intended to prevent the appellate court from being unnecessar-
ily burdened with . . . cases [of original jurisdiction], which
might just as well be determined in the circuit courts, and then,
if errors were committed, a writ of error will lie to the appellate
court [i.e., the Supreme Court of Appeals]."
The present Rule XVIII, presumably resulted from the same inten-
tion: to save the court's time by refusing original cases which could
be instituted elsewhere with the thought that if errors are commit-
" Id. at 320-21.
" See notes 36 & 37 supra.
" This is a wise course. See note 35 supra.
43 This statement quotes from and paraphrases State ex rel. Burgett v. Oakley,
184 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1971).
4' 31 W. Va. 608, 8 S.E. 267 (1888).
" Id. at 617, 8 S.E. at 272.
11
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ted, they will be reviewable in the Supreme Court of Appeals on
appeal.
Conceding the court's authority to make reasonable rules,
nevertheless, the constitutional standard of reasonableness ob-
viously cannot deprive a citizen of his right to his remedy and
cannot unduly restrict the availability of the constitutional writ.
The mere desire to save the court's time, while shifting the initial
expenditure of court time to another court, reserving for the Su-
preme Court of Appeals the possibility of spending time on appeal,
and, at the same time, increasing the time of litigants, is not a
sufficient reason to withhold a constitutional remedy from the
meritorious claimant. Moreover, there is no mechanical necessity
for a rule of exclusion simply to protect the court from taking its
time to consider relief obtainable elsewhere. It is the proliferation
of applications for post-conviction habeas corpus relief which is
plaguing the Supreme Court of Appeals and, indeed, most courts.'
In post-conviction cases the Supreme Court of Appeals has
statutory authority to transfer the case, at its inception, to a local
court.5 2 The same is true of other types of habeas corpus cases. 3
Thus, under the statutes the court can easily avoid spending its
time on the meritorious habeas corpus cases, while providing a
remedy, by simply granting the writ and making it returnable
before the appropriate circuit or statutory court. This is preferable
to requiring a refiling of the petition and a reinstitution of the case
in a lower court which, notwithstanding that the refusal of the
Supreme Court of Appeals is "without prejudice,"" may be influ-
enced by what it perceives to be the court's opinion that the case
is either not meritorious or unimportant. Making the writ returna-
ble before a lower court tells that court, in effect, that the petition
states a claim and that the allegations, if proved, require the grant-
ing of relief. This procedure is especially advantageous to the post-
conviction petitioner who seeks federal habeas corpus relief under
5' The problem of the number of cases and, more fundamentally, the availabil-
ity of federal review of the federal constitutional aspects of state criminal trials has
strained relations between the federal and state judiciaries. One reason is that the
lowest federal trial courts review the state convictions after they have been reviewed
by the highest state appellate courts. Some suggestions for improving relations
between the federal and state judiciaries are contained in Hopkins, Federal Habeas
Corpus: Easing the Tension Between State and Federal Courts, 44 ST. JOHNS L.
REv. 660 (1970). See also note 4 supra and note 56 infra.
52 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-4A-3(b) (1974 Cum. Supp.).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-2 (1966).
W. VA. R. PRAc. Sup. CT. OF APP. XVIII, § 1.
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the United States Constitution and the pertinent federal statute."
By his application for a writ followed by a denial to hear the appli-
cation in the Supreme Court of Appeals, the federal requirement
that the petitioner "exhaust" his available State remedies has
perhaps been fulfilled.55
In prohibition, the typical case is brought against a circuit
judge to restrain him from proceeding in a criminal case when the
indictment is improper or has been improperly returned.57 This
sort of case-and any case seeking to prohibit a circuit judge from
proceeding in a case-obviously must be brought, if at all, in the
Supreme Court of Appeals, the only court superior to circuit
courts. Some prohibition cases are brought against statutory
judges and other tribunals, but many of these cases have always
been brought in the lower courts. There is nothing to suggest that
prohibition cases which could be brought in lower courts are clut-
tering the docket of the Supreme Court of Appeals. Regarding
mandamus, there are obviously cases involving the highest state
officials and fundamental governmental policy which should be
considered, and traditionally have been considered originally by
the Supreme Court of Appeals.58 Other cases have been brought in
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971).
51 Leftwich v. Coiner, 424 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1970), held that the filing of an
original habeas corpus petition in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
which summarily denied the petition was sufficient to exhaust state remedies pre-
paratory to applying to the federal courts for relief. This was true notwithstanding
the availability of relief in the lower state courts that had concurrent jurisdiction.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, contains dicta to the effect that if the
petition were dismissed by the Supreme Court of Appeals "without prejudice to the
petitioner's application for relief in a [lower] court of record," the petitioner should
pursue his remedy in the lower court. Id. at 160-61. Under the new rule, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals will note "upon the face of" a petition upon which it refused
to issue a writ or rule the fact that the dismissal, if on the ground that the applicant
should have gone to a lower court, is "without prejudice". W. VA. R. PRAC. SUP.
CT. OF APP. XVIII, § 1. It would appear, then, that Rule XVIII will create a new
class of habeas corpus cases which have been summarily denied, but which cannot
then proceed into federal court, because of the lack of exhaustion.
An example is State ex rel. Burgett v. Oakley, 181 S.E.2d 19 (W. Va. 1971).
' At least two recent examples involved both the petitioner and the respondent
as high officials. In State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, 154 W. Va. 253, 175
S.E.2d 172 (1970), in which the Governor was permitted to intervene, the court
granted the Attorney General's petition to require the Clerk of the House of Dele-
gates to publish a budget bill. In State ex rel. Kelly v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 106 (W.
Va. 1973), appeal dismissed 414 U.S. 1118 (1974), the Treasurer obtained a writ of
mandamus to compel the Governor to transfer to the Treasurer moneys received
by the Governor as revenue sharing funds from the federal government.
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the lower courts, with the result that the court has simply not been
swamped by applications for mandamus; or for mandamus and
prohibition in combination. It was the great number of habeas
corpus petitions which inspired the court to promulgate the new
rule, ignoring the statutory procedure for remanding the cases to
other courts. 9
In conclusion, the court's rule.restricting the availability of the
constitutional writs has as its purpose the solving of an imaginary
problem. The court was not being deluged with unimportant origi-
nal petitions and, even if it were, the new rule will not be the time-
saver it was designed to be. In fact, if anything, it will unreasona-
bly increase the burdens placed upon the entire judicial system
and its litigants and will result in delayed final decisions. More
importantly, the history of the judicial article of the Constitution
and the court's prior decisions have made it clear that the Rule,
by restricting a citizen's right to a constitutional writ in a court
having jurisdiction, is unconstitutional.
11 Without actually going to the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of
Appeals and counting petitions, analyzing the same, and noting the dispositions,
there is no accurate method of judging the court's previous original jurisdiction
caseload. However, a casual review of several issues of The Syllabus Service indi-
cates that the number of original cases is rather slight. For example, the issue of
July 30, 1974, reflected the disposition of the pending applications for writs immedi-
ately prior to the court's adjournment of that particular term of court. The court
granted appeals in four cases, refused appeals in twelve cases, granted one rule in
mandamus, denied two rules in mandamus, and denied two applications for habeas
corpus. It did not consider any applications for prohibition.
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